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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ST!\TE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
STANLEY VAN OLDROYD, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19335 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal case. By information filed in 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Sevier County, the appellant, 
Stanley van Oldroyd, was charged with two crimes; aggravated 
assault, contrary to u.C.A. 1953, ~ 76-5-103, and assault on a 
police officer, contrary to U.C .A. 1953, ~ 76-5-102.4 (R.l). 
Proceedings of the Circuit Court resulted in a dismissal of 
the offense of assault on a police officer, and appellant was 
arraigned in the District Court on the single charge of 
aggravated assault (R. 15). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury which found him 
guilty of aggravated assault on May 3, 1983, in the Sixth 
Judicial District Court of sevier county, the Honorable Don V. 
Tibbs presiding (R. 70). The District Court sentenced 
appellant to a three-year term of probation, which called for 
a fine of $2,500.00 and incarceration in the County Jail for 
sixty days. Appellant appeals from the verdict and judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the appellant's conviction and sentence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the time of the crime, appellant and his wife 
were experiencing marital difficulties and were living 
separate and apart. Mrs. Oldroyd was residing in a basement 
apartment (apartment No. 5) in Richfield, Utah (T. 69). 
on February 24, 1983, at approximately 8:20 p.m., 
appellant appeared at the door of Mrs. Oldroyd's apartment. 
She refused him admittance to the apartment and requested that 
he leave (T. 70). Mrs. Oldroyd testified that she was afraid 
of him and telephoned the police for assistance (T. 71). 
Appellant remained near the doorway for about thirty 
minutes (T. 70). He and Mrs. Oldroyd could see one another 
through a closed glass door, but Mrs. Oldroyd did not see a 
gun in appellant's possession (T. 74). 
Officer John Evans of the Richfield Police 
Department responded to Mrs. Oldroyd's telephone call (T. 7nl. 
Officers Rex Dana and Virgil Sickels of the Richfield police 
Department also arrived at the apartment building at 
approximately the same time as did Officer Evans (T. 86). 
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officer Evans testified that he did not know where apartment 
Nn. 5 was located IT. 76), but as he approached the stairwell 
0f the apartment, followed by officers Dana and Sickels IT. 
771, he heard the sound of a revolver being cocked. on 
hearing the sound, he turned on his flashlight and saw 
appellant seated on the fourth or fifth step of the stairway 
leading down to the apartment, with a revolver pointed 
directly at him IT. 77, 78, 82). Officer Evans jumped back 
and went to his patrol car for a radio and a shotgun (T. 78). 
Officer Evans returned to the scene and asked 
appellant several times to throw his gun out. After five to 
eight minutes, appellant did so. Officer Evans picked the 
revolver up from the ground and found it to be in an uncocked 
position and with no bullets in it IT. 82, 83). When Officer 
Evans first saw appellant on the stairway, he could not see 
whether the hammer of the revolver was in a cocked position 
IT. 82, 83). 
When Officers Dana and Sickels arrived at the 
apartment building, Officer Dana walked over to appellant's 
truck which was parked on the shoulder of the road. Finding 
no one in the truck, he walked over to the other two officers 
near the stairway to apartment No. 5 IT. 86, 87). Officer 
Dana testified that as he approached the two officers he heard 
what sounded like the turning of a cylinder on a revolver 
IT. 88,90). 
Officer Sickels testified that when officer Evans 
went to his patrol car for a radio and shotgun, he was at the 
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top of the stairway looking down into the stairwell where fr"ci 
the light of Officer Dana's flashlight he saw appellant 
standing with his revolver pointed up the stairway (T. 93, 
97). while Officer Evans was asking appellant to throw his 
gun out, Officer Evans heard a cylinder turn and the clicking 
of a revolver (T. 94). 
After appellant was arrested, six bullets were found 
in his left front pocket (T. 89) and a holster for the 
revolver in his right rear pocket (T. 81). 
Appellant testified in his own defense. He 
testified that he stood at the doorway to his wife's apartment 
talking to her for some time before the police officers 
arrived (T. 105). He han the revolver with him which he 
intenrled to leave with his wife (T. 111). Although he had 
bullets in his pocket, he never took them out (T. 106, 107). 
When the revolver is opened, the cylinder falls out. The 
cylinder was open all the time and was never closed (T. 109, 
112). When asked if the cylinder rotated making a clicking 
sound heard by Officers Dana and Sickels, appellant replied 
that it did (T. 109, llO). 
Appellant testified that because of the flashlight 
shining in his eyes, did not recognize Officer Evans, nor did 
he observe a police uniform (T. 107). He said he did not 
point his revolver at anyone (T. 108) or ever aim it up the 
stairway (T. 114), but that when officer Evans shined his 
flashlight down the stairwell, he was leaning against the east 
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wall away from the steps with his right arm hanging down along 
his side and the revolver hanging on his finger with the 
cylinder open (T. 114). 
Appellant submitted to the District Court his 
requested Jury Instruction No. 2, which charged that the jury 
should consider two lesser included instructions to the 
offense of aggravated assault, one being "threatening with a 
~angerous weapon" as proscribed by U.C.A. 1953, S 76-10-506, 
and the other being ordinary "assault" as proscribed by U.C.A. 
1953, S 76-5-102 (R. 51,52). The Court refused to give the 
requested Instruction and appellant took exception thereto 
(T. 122, 123). In his brief to this Court, under Relief 
sought on Appeal, appellant claims the District Court 
committed error in failing to charge the jury with an 
instruction regarding a lesser included offense. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPF.RLY REFUSED TO GIVE 
APPELLANT'S PROFFERED JURY INSTRUCTION 
REGARDING THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF 
"THREATENING WITH A DANGEROUS WEAPON." 
Appellant contends that the District Court erred 
when it refused to give a preferred jury instruction regarding 
the lesser included offense of "threatening with a dangerous 
weapon" as proscribed by u.cs.A. 1953, S 76-10-506. In his 
aigument, appellant states that as authority for his position, 
he relies primarily on the rules and principles announced by 
this Court in the recent case of State v. Raker, Case NO. 
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18245, filed on ~eptember 21, 19R3. Respondent also relies on 
that case as authority for its position. 
In Baker, this Court clarified the standards to be 
used in giving a jury instruction with respect to a lesser 
included offense. After reviewing case and statutory law in 
depth, the Court concluded, for reasons set forth in detail in 
its decision, that there are two standards to be applied. 
First, when the prosecution requests the jury instruction, the 
•necessarily included offense" standard should be applied. 
This standard relies upon a comparison of the abstract 
statutory elements of the offenses, i.e., both the legal 
elements and the actual evidence or inferences needed to 
demonstrate those elements must necessarily be included within 
the original charged offense (Baker, slip op. at 217). 
Second, when the defendant requests the jury instruction, the 
•evidence-based" standard should be applied. This standard 
requires an analysis of the evidence offered at trial and is 
incorporated in U.C.A. 1953, S 76-1-402(4), which is discussed 
below(~, slip op. at 219). 
The definitions of an •included offense" and the 
rule for charging the jury in respect to the lesser included 
offense are contained in u.c.A. 1953, S 76-1-402, which 
provides in the part pertinent to this case: 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of 
an offense included in the offense charged 
but may not be convicted of both the 
Offense charged and the included offense. 
An offense is so included when: 
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(a) It is established by proof of the 
same or less than all the facts required 
to establish the commission of the offense 
charged; or 
* * * 
(4) The court shall not be obligated 
to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a 
rational basis for a verdict acquitting 
the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting him of the including offense. 
The requirements of Section 76-l-402(3)(a) were 
explained by the Court in Baker, supra (slip op. at 9), as 
follows: 
Paragraph (3)(a) says that an offense is 
included in a charged offense when "it is 
established by proof of the same or less 
than all the facts required to establish 
the commission of the offense charged." 
The analysis of whether an offense is 
included for purposes of deciding whether 
to grant a defendant's request for a jury 
instruction must therefore begin with the 
proof of facts at trial. If the same 
facts tend to prove elements of more than 
one statutory offense, then the offenses 
are related under S 76-1-402. The 
application of~ 76-l-402(3)(a) will thus 
require some reference to the statutory 
elements~the offenses involved in order 
to determine whether given facts are 
"required to establish the commission of 
the offense charged." 
Appellant was charged with the crime of aggravated 
assault which is proscribed by u.c.A. 1953, S 76-5-103. This 
section must be read in conjunction with U.C.A. 1953, S 
76-5-102. The portions of these statutes pertinent to this 
rase provide: 
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76-5-102(1) Assault is: 
* * * 
(b) A threat, accompanied by a show of 
immediate force or violence, to do bodily 
injury to another. 
76-5-103. (1) a person commits aggravated 
assault if he commits assault as defined 
in Section 76-5-102 and; 
* * * 
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such 
means of force likely to produce death or 
serious bodily injury. 
The crime of "threatPning with a dangerous weapon' is 
proscribed by u.c.A. 1953, ~ 76-10-506, which provides: 
76-10-506. Every person, except 
those persons described in Section 
76-10-503, who, not in necessary defense 
in the presence of two or more persons, 
draws or exhibits any dangerous weapon in 
an angry and threatening manner or 
unlawfully uses the same in any fight or 
quarrel is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, 
Appellant argues that "threatening with a dangerous 
weapon" is a lesser included offense to the offense charged. 
He states that two elements in Section 76-5-103 and 76-10-506 
"overlap" in that they both contain the elements of a threat, 
or in a threatening manner, and the use of a weapon, and that 
under the facts of this case the two statutes proscribe the 
same conduct. In State v. Verdin, 595 P.2d 862 (Utah 1979), 
which case the appellant discusses at some length in his 
brief, this Court held that -tic 1 "'fi-5-103 and section 
76-10-506 do not proscribe tr., • me coriciuct, saying: "the 
distinctions in levels of proscribed conduct are clear and 
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easily to be comprehended." In arriving at that conclusion, 
the court employed the •necessarily included offense" 
6 tandard. It appears in the instant case, however, that under 
the •evidence-based" standard, the offense of threatening with 
a dangerous weapon would be a lesser included offense to 
aggravated assault for the reason that there is an overlapping 
of certain elements of each offense, as stated by appellant, 
and the evidence produced by the prosecution would prove all 
of the elements of each offense. 
Assuming that the offense of threatening with a 
dangerous weapon is a lesser included offense in the offense 
of aggravated assault, the court under section 76-1-402(4) is 
still not obligated to charge the jury as to the lesser 
offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict 
acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting 
him of the included offense. With respect to Section 
76-1-402(4), this court said in the recent case of State v. 
Crick, et al., No. 18080, filed November 9, 1983 (slip op. at 
6, 7): 
In determining whether there is a 
•rational basis• for acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting him of a lesser included 
offense, the court must, of course, view 
the evidence and the inferences that can 
be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the defense. state v. 
Gillian, 23 Utah 2d at 376, 463 P.2d at 
814. Similarly, as we said more recently 
in State v. Baker, supra, slip op. at 10: 
(W]en the evidence is ambiguous and 
therefore susceptible to alternative 
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interpretations, and one alternative would 
permit acquittal of the greater offense and 
conviction of the lesser, a jury question exists 
and the court must give a lesser included 
offense instruction at the request of the 
defendant. 
The evidence in this case does not provide a 
rational basis for appellant's requested instruction on 
threatening with a dangerous weapon. The evidence presented 
by the prosecution is clear and unambiguous and not 
susceptible to any alternative interpretation permitting 
acquittal of the offense of threatening with a dangerous 
weapon. Officer Evans heard the cocking of a revolver, turned 
on his flashlight and saw defendant pointing a revolver at 
him; in a separate incident, Officer Sickels saw appellant 
standing in the stairwell with a revolver pointing up the 
stairway; while Officer Evans was asking appellant to throw 
his gun out, Officers Sickels and Dana heard a cylinder turn 
and the clicking of a revolver; upon arrest, six bullets were 
found in appellant's left front pants pocket and a holster in 
his right rear pocket; and during the time appellant was 
talking to his wife, she did not see a revolver. 
Appellant contradicted the prosecutor's evidence. 
He testified that he removed the bullets from the revolver 
when he took it out of his truck; that he intended to give the 
revolver to his wife; that the cylinder of the revolver was 
open all the time he was in the stairwell; that at no time dirl 
he point the revolver at the police or up the stairway but was 
merely standing at the bottom of the stairwell with both arms 
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hanging at his sides with the revolver hanging down on one of 
his fingers. 
Thus, the evidence is such that, if the jury were to 
believe appellant's testimony, no offense at all was committed 
because the element of a threat is missing, which element is a 
necessary element in both offenses. The evidence shows that 
appellant made no verbal threats and, according to his 
testimony, he did not exhibit the revolver in a threatening 
manner or otherwise threaten the police officers. Conse-
quently, there was no rational basis for a verdict acquitting 
appellant of aggravated assault and convicting him of the 
lesser included offense of threatening with a dangerous 
weapon. 
Appellant's argument that the District Court erred 
in failing to charge the jury with the lesser included offense 
cl threatening with a dangerous weapon ignores the provision 
of U.C.A. 1953, ~ 76-1-402(4), which provides that the court 
shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a 
verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting him of the inlcuded offense. The prosecution met 
its burden of proof with respect to the offense of aggravated 
assault and there is nothing in the evidence presented by the 
prosecutor that would warrant a finding that a lesser offense 
was committed. Likewise, there is nothing in the evidence 
presented by appellant that would warrant a finding that a 
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lesser offense was committed since his evidence, if bel1everl 
by the jury, would only prove his co~plete innocence, This i~ 
a case wherein either the offense of aggravated assault was 
committed or no offense was committed. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court did not err in refusing to submit 
to the jury the lesser included offense requestd by appellant 
and the verdict and judgment rendered in the District Court 
should be affirmed, 
~ 
RESPECTFULLY submited this~ day of March, 1984, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
}JuJ;~:~~ 
H. WRIG~ VOL~-E-R. 
Assistant Attorney General 
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